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ENFORCING CONTRACTS IN
DYSFUNCTIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS:
THE CLOSE RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORDERS
A Reply to McMillan and Woodruff
Ariel Porat*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When the public order is dysfunctional, a private order for en
forcing contracts will develop. In the absence of courts, transactors
will seek ways to secure performance without recourse to legal sanc
tions. Social and economic sanctions imposed on the party in breach,
whether by the aggrieved party or by the economic and social commu
nity in which both parties operate, replace legal sanctions. These sanc
tions sometimes arise within a private order functioning spontane
ously, as when ongoing contractual relationships prevail between the
parties, or when a close-knit economic or social community exists in
which information concerning breaches of contract flows freely. In
other cases, sanctions will be enforced within an organized private or
der, in which market intermediaries and trade associations enable in
formation to flow and thereby provide transactors with the security es
sential for entering contracts.
John McMillan and Christopher
Woodruff have examined the characteristics of the private order that
emerges in response to a dysfunctional public order, and the private
order's influence on transactors.1 Their article relies mainly on em* Professor of Law and Director of the Cegla Institute, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv Uni
versity. L.L.B. 1983, J.S.D. 1990, Tel Aviv University. - Ed. I am grateful to Assaf Jacob,
Ron Harris and Omri Yadlin for their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are also
due to Ms. Batia Stein for her linguistic editing work.
1. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional
Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000). Writers differ on the priority of public order
over private order. For the view that "the justification for centralized law [which is similar
to the "public order" terminology used in these comments] begins with the identification of a
failure in the incentive structure of social norms," see Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law

for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1643-44 (1996); Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Moderni
zation of Law, 16 lNT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1996). For a preference of public order, see
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996).
For a critical comment on both Cooter and Posner, see Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering
Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (1996). For a preference of private order over public or

der because the latter produces legitimate and illegitimate rules, while the former generally
produces legitimate rules, see Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Pro2459
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pirical studies conducted by the authors in Vietnam and in several
Eastern European countries. They start with the assertion that, for
various reasons, the public order is dysfunctional in these countries,
and legal sanctions enacted against the party in breach are therefore
ineffective. They examine how private order arises in response to this
purported deficiency, and analyze the interaction between public and
private orders when both function concurrently. This paper responds
to their work by focusing on some of the contours of the relationship
between public and private orders.
In the real world, one cannot draw a distinct line between coun
tries where a public order operates and countries where a private one
obtains - both orders tend to function in every country, in varying
degrees. This occurs because, when enforcing contracts, no public or
der is ever perfect to the point of making the private order redundant.
Indeed, the public order need not be at the brink of collapse in order
for a private order to materialize. A private order may emerge even
when the public order is only partially dysfunctional, or when dysfunc
tionality is limited to specific types of transactions. The character of
the private order, its scope, and its components, are inextricably re
lated to the reasons leading to the emergence of a private order in the
first place. Hence, a comprehensive theory about the emergence of a
private order, whether as replacement for or complement to public
order, needs to consider the various reasons for the dysfunctionality of
the public order, which resulted in the creation of the private order in
the first place.
In Part II, I suggest reasons for the dysfunctionality of the public
order, and show that dysfunctionality is usually partial. I then exam
ine the relationship between the reasons for the dysfunctionality of the
public order and the characteristics of the private order emerging in
response; this may be considered a proposal for further empirical re
search aiming to examine the nature of this relationship.
Since a private order always operates beside the public one, a
question arises concerning the interaction between them.2 In Part III,
I examine how the content of the law operating within the public or
der might affect the concurrent private order. The law operating
within the public order may support the private order, repress it, or, at
times, acknowledge its existence but endorse a neutral attitude toward
it. At the same time, the private order may also affect, through its
own mechanisms, the character and content of the public order. In the
course of discussing the interaction between the two orders, I also
consider whether, when the court awards damages for breach of conduction of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1997). The
classic, pioneering work that discusses the advantages of private order is ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
2. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2446-55.
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tract within the framework of the public order, it should deduct from it
the value of the sanction imposed by the private order on the party in
breach. I point out the advantages of such a deduction, particularly
the efficient incentives it provides to the contractual parties.
I touch briefly on the interaction between the public order and the
social networks functioning within the private order in Part IV. I at
tempt to explain McMillan and Woodruff's finding that social net
works constitute a substitute for the public order in the sense that,
when the public order is stronger, reliance on social networks lessens.3
Part V provides a brief conclusion.

II.

REASONS FOR A DYSFUNCTIONAL PUBLIC ORDER AND TIIE
REsPONSE OF TIIE PRIVATE ORDER

Parties will consider a public order ideal if the courts (and the en
forcers of the courts' decisions) enforce all contracts according to the
substantive law preferred by the parties without incurring costs of liti
gation, with great speed and expertise, without bias, without mistakes,
and without the parties incurring damages through litigation pro
ceedings.
No empirical studies seem required to determine that these condi
tions are never actually present to a perfect degree. Hence, parties to
a contract will never view a public order as ideal, and potential trans
actors will naturally seek ways of overcoming the failings of the public
order. Typically, their work takes place at two levels: to amend the
flaws of the public order directly, and to develop a private order acting
beside, or altogether replacing, the public order.
The reaction of potential transactors depends on the character of
the flaws affecting the public order and hindering its functioning.
These flaws may be "generalized" - that is, equally relevant to all po
tential transactors, such as when all judges in a system are corrupt.
More frequently, however, at least in Western legal systems, flaws may
be deemed "partial" - that is, their harmful effects are context-bound
or industry-specific. Thus, in a given industry, such as the diamond in
dustry, where transactors may be particularly sensitive to the public
exposure entailed by litigation, they may develop a private order to
avoid the need for litigation in the courts.4 In contrast, in an industry
where the risk of exposure is lower (or nonexistent), transactors may
not be as reluctant to resort to the courts. Similarly, another industry,

3.
4.

See id. at 2451.

See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 134-35 {1992} [hereinafter Bernstein, The
Diamond Industry].
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such as the grain and feed industry,5 may find dissatisfaction with the
actual substantive law operating in the public order, and consequently
traders may seek an alternative system applying a different law. This
sense of dissatisfaction may not be shared by traders in another indus
try, with different characteristics, who are comfortable with the sub
stantive law applied by the courts.
In the following sections, I examine several typical flaws impairing
the functioning of the public order. These flaws fall under three ru
brics: flaws relating to judges, flaws relating to court decisions, and
flaws relating to legal proceedings. The discussion will consider sev
eral possible responses to these flaws within both the public and the
private orders. Note that several flaws may operate simultaneously,
either as "generalized," or as "partial" flaws.
A.

Flaws Relating to Judges

A potential and particularly serious reason for dysfunction in the
public order relates to the corruption of the judges, their biases, or
their lack of professionalism. In these cases, it may be assumed that
plaintiffs who believe they will profit from these flaws will use legal
proceedings, whereas those who fear they will lose because of these
flaws will not. Plaintiffs who cannot foresee whether they will benefit
or suffer from the corruption or the lack of professionalism may be de
terred by the uncertainty and forego legal proceedings altogether.
Others may forsake recourse to the public order because they are out
raged by the corruption of the system, regardless of whether or not it
works in their favor. Finally, since these disputes involve contracts, a
party fearing unfair treatment in legal proceedings may attempt, ab
initio, to preclude recourse to the public order.
A private order may develop in all these cases, as private actors at
tempt to overcome the problems of a corrupt or unprofessional public
order. If the problem is limited to the judges' lack of professionalism,
without necessarily entailing general corruption in the public order,
and provided that judgments are plausibly enforced, we may expect
institutions of arbitration to develop, staffed by professional (and
assumedly uncorrupt) arbitrators. As long as the public order pro
vides a reasonable way of enforcing the arbitrators' rulings, the prob
lem of unprofessional judges might be solved.
If, however, corruption in the public order extends to enforcement,
arbitration alone will not suffice because its effectiveness depends on a
proper system of enforcement. A more extensive private order will
develop. Potential transactors will seek ways of implementing non-

5. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 {1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Im
manent Business Norms].
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legal economic and social sanctions, which will replace legal sanctions
and which will be imposed by the aggrieved parties and by the com
munity, either spontaneously or in organized fashion.6
B.

Flaws Relating to Court Decisions

Enforcement of contracts by the public order may be impaired also
because of flaws relating to court decisions. Three types of flaws may
fall in this group: flaws resulting from information problems in the
courts; flaws due to the application of a substantive law that the par
ties find unsatisfactory; and flaws due to courts' refusal to enforce cer
tain agreements.
1.

Information Problems Impairing the Court's Ability to
Enforce Contracts Effectively

Courts sometimes lack information required to rule on contractual
disputes, thus making it highly questionable whether their decisions
can properly reflect the parties' rights and duties. For example, in the
diamond industry, as we learn from Lisa Bernstein's study, it is ex
tremely difficult for the seller to prove lost opportunities due to the
breach.7 Consequently, courts ruling on this type of transaction award
low amounts of damages, resulting in undercompensated sellers and
underdeterred buyers. Sellers will therefore seek alternative forms of
protection, ex post and ex ante.
Several consequences may ensue when the functioning of the pub
lic order is impaired due to information problems leading to under
compensation. In the public order, we may expect improvements in
the courts' handling of information problems. Courts awarding dam
ages may become more accommodating when applying the certainty
of damages requirement,8 or may tend to award compensation for lost
chances more frequently,9 or may be more generous when the sum of
the damages is at the discretion of the court (for instance, when
6. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2426-32.
7. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 136. Sometimes the secrecy
consideration will make sellers reluctant to disclose this information in the courts. See id. at
134-135. See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law,
109 YALE LJ. 1885 (2000) (arguing that secrecy interest deters aggrieved parties from suing
for breach of contract, leading to underdeterrence of parties in breach).
8. On the requirement of certainty and the courts' tendency to relax it in certain cases,
see u.c.c. § 1-106 {1999); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 {1981); E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 829-34 (3d ed. 1999); JAMES J. WlilTE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 379-81 (4th ed. 1995).
9. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 834. The classic case in which an English court
awarded damages for lost chances to a winner in a preliminary round in a beauty contest is
Chaplin v. Hicks, 2 K.B. 786 (1911); see also Rombola v. Cosindas, 220 N.E.2d 919 (Mass.
1966).
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awarding damages for nonpecuniary losses or when deciding on the
validity of a liquidated damages clause).
Furthermore, we may expect parties potentially affected by prob
lems of information to adopt measures to preempt them. Classic con
tractual tools offer a relatively moderate measure, such as setting a
liquidated damages clause covering damages hard to prove in court.
Assuming courts will not insist on the aggrieved party proving actual
losses as a prerequisite for enforcing the liquidated damages clause,10
information problems relating to the magnitude of the losses - but
not to the existence of a breach
will be alleviated.
At times, however, this may prove insufficient. Parties facing
problems of proof may prefer to send their disputes to arbitrators who
are familiar with the relevant market and who remain unconstricted
by rigid rules of evidence.11 We may also expect an expansion of
mechanisms used to gather relevant information (for arbitrators or
judges), such as prices and quality, the types of losses caused by
breach, the ability of the aggrieved party to cover or mitigate damages,
and so on. For instance, if diamond sellers have difficulty proving
losses incurred due to breaches of contract, information-gathering
mechanisms may provide the court or the arbitrator with statistical
data enabling them to award compensation for lost opportunities or
for lost chances.
The most far-fetched response to the information problem is the
development of a full private order imposing social or economic sanc
tions by the relevant community. Information channels, some sponta
neous and some organized (such as business networks or trade asso
ciations), should emerge.12 Information channels created for enforcing
economic sanctions may also serve two additional purposes. First,
they allow transactors to locate suitable contractual parties.13 Second,
they supply information to arbitrators or courts. For example, a trade
association that gathers information necessary for the imposition of a
nonlegal sanction may, in the course of its work, acquire information
about prices, quality of products, trade usages, courses of performing
contracts, courses of mitigating damages, and types of losses entailed
by breach of contract. This information may be used by the court (or
-

10. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1999); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356
(1981). Both sections direct courts to consider the reasonableness of the liquidated damages
clause in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of
proving loss. The U.C.C. adds another consideration which is "the inconvenience or nonfea
sibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-718(1). Accordingly, courts
can use the anticipated damages and the difficulties of proof as the main considerations, and
ignore the exact amount of the actual loss, when proof is so problematic.
11. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.

REV. 373, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions].
12 See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2426-32.
13. This also holds true for social networks. See infra Part IV.

August 2000]

Enforcing Contracts

2465

the arbitrator) when dealing with the dispute before it. In this fashion,
mechanisms operating in the private order contribute to the strength
ening of the public order. In the course of time, a more effective pub
lic order may lessen the need for a private order. By using informa
tion gathered under the private order, however, the public order
increases the overall benefits accruing from these private-order
mechanisms. In turn, these mechanisms may expand and reinforce the
private order. Hence, this is a dynamic process, with one order sup
porting and strengthening the other but, at the same time, itself be
coming stronger and decreasing the need for the other.

2.

The Parties' Dissatisfaction with the Substantive
Law Applied in Court

Parties to a contract may seek alternatives outside the public order
because they find the substantive law applied in the courts unsatisfac
tory. First, the parties may fear that the substantive values upheld by
the courts differ irreconcilably from their own. Thus, Orthodox Jews
may be suspicious of courts, knowing them to be guided by secular law
rather than by Jewish Law. Second, parties to a contract may fear that
the court will not enable them to realize their will as expressed in the
contract. Thus, traders in the grain and feed industry, who wish their
legal disputes to be decided strictly according to the express terms of
the contract, may fear that the court will permit course of perform
ance, course of dealing, and usage of trade to trump express written
terms.14 Third, the parties may not be satisfied with the remedies pro
vided by the court. Fourth, parties to a contract may find that the law
applied by the court is ambiguous and uncertain, dominated by vague
standards instead of bright line rules, thus impairing their reliance and
planning ability.15
The parties' reluctance to resort to the public order may be con
fronted in two ways - either the courts or the parties will adapt.
First, the public order may try to improve its ways to make them ac
ceptable to the parties. For example, if traders expect application of
the express terms of the contract, the court will refrain from imposing
norms of good faith and cooperation on their relationship. If the par
ties do not expect the written contract to exhaustively delineate their
rights, the court will develop rules and doctrines intended to meet this
expectation. Thus, courts will develop rules of interpretation for ex-

14. See Bernstein, Immanent Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1787-815.
15. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001) [herein
after Bernstein, The Cotton Industry] (arguing that the clarity of the rules applied by tribu
nals operating in the cotton industry makes them more attractive to parties than courts ap
plying the more vague legal rules of the U.C.C.).
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arnining the course of dealing and the course of performance;16 they
will introduce flexibility in applying the parole evidence rule;17 they
will apply broadly the principle of good faith in performance;18 and
they will develop the principle of interpretation presently applied to
standard contracts, according to which the reasonable expectation of
the parties can trump the written terms of the contract.19 If traders
expect usage of trade to apply to their relationships, the court can rec
ognize this usage as part of the contract between them.20
Second, for their part, parties to a contract can attempt to have the
substantive law desirable to them applied by courts. Thus, they will
state in the contract the rules that will apply to their relationship, and
hope that the court will respect it. At times, the public order may con
sider their statement void when the chosen substantive law appears to
violate public policy (for instance, when it discriminates against
women, limits basic freedoms, or is injurious to third parties). The
parties may also find it too difficult and onerous to clarify their wishes,
and will renounce this attempt beforehand.
Notably, both these responses, by the courts and by the private
parties, occur within the public order only. They do not require the
development of a private order. One may nevertheless emerge, how
ever - for example, a private order may offer arbitrations that ensure
the parties the application of their desired substantive law.21 Arbitra
tion mechanisms available in the diamond, grain, feed, and cotton in
dustries provide examples.22 Tribunals in the Jewish Orthodox com
munity (called "Courts of Justice") are another example. In these
tribunals, rabbi-judges rule according to Jewish Law and often resort
to social sanctions (such as boycotting and exclusion). Dissatisfaction
with substantive law may also contribute to the development of a
wider private order where we will find economic and social sanctions.

16. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), {11), 1-205, 2-208 {1999); RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§§ 219-223 {1981).
17. The trend in modem contract law is toward a less formal application of the parole
evidence rule. This trend is reflected in U.C.C. § 2-202 {1999), and in RESTATEMENT
{SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-217 {1981); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 435;
Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 {Cal. 1968).
18. See u.c.c. § 1-203 (1999); RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 (1981).
19. See RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211 {1981); Darner Motor Sales v.
Universal Underwriters, 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984).
20. See u.c.c. §§ 1-201{3), {11), 1-205 {1999); REsTATEl\IBNT {SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§§ 219-222 (1981).
21. See Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 11, at 409-10.
22 See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 126-27; Bernstein, Immanent
Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1771-78; Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15.
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The Public Order Consciously Refuses to Enforce
Certain Agreements

In some areas, the litigating parties are not reluctant to resort to
the public order, but the public order refuses to enforce their agree
ments. The refusal may be due to legislators' or judges' perceptions of
these contracts as detrimental to third parties (agreements to commit
a tort23), to the parties themselves (agreements made under duress or
unconscionable agreements), or to society at large (agreements in re
straint of trade24). In other cases, the courts will not enforce agree
ments because judicial interference might be harmful to the relations
between the parties (agreements between spouses25). In some cases,
the courts' refusal to enforce agreements may be justified by the policy
against encouraging litigation or interfering with the judicial process.26
Potential transactors, who may nevertheless wish to enter into legally
unenforceable agreements, must rely on nonlegal sanctions.
C.

Flaws Relating to Legal Proceedings

Flaws relating to legal proceedings may lead potential transactors
to refrain from using the public order for enforcing contracts. These
flaws include the costs of litigation, the long waiting periods until en
forcement takes place, and the damage incurred by the legal proceed
ings.

1.

The Costs of Litigation

Certain types of disputes do not reach the courts due to the high
cost of legal proceedings on the one hand, and the low value (to the
parties) of the issue involved on the other. This forms a prominent
feature of many consumer transaction disputes. The public order may
respond by enabling class action suits or by awarding generous puni
tive damages, thus increasing the profitability of turning to the courts
and creating an effective sanction against traders. The public order
alternatively may establish small claims courts, where legal proceed
ings are not costly. Finally, a private order (such as consumer organi-

23. See, e.g., Williams v. Wtlson, 181 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark. 1960); Sayres v. Decker
Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744 (N.Y. 1924).

24. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981).
25. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 337-43.
26. See, e.g., Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to en
force contract whereby attorneys would pay owner of ambulance company for injury case
referrals); Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1963) (refusing to enforce contractual provision that forbade using previous negotia
tions and dealings between the parties to interpret the contract).
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zations) may develop, mainly designed to provide information about
traders' reputation.

2.

Long Waiting Periods until the Enforcement

Long waiting periods at the courts also contribute to the dysfunc
tionality of the public order, and result in enforcement that comes
years after the conflict erupted. Transactors thus may find the litiga
tion procedure in the public order irrelevant to their needs. They will
prefer arbitrations with shorter waiting periods,27 they will develop a
private order for enforcing arbitration rulings implementing nonlegal
sanctions,28 or at times they may be satisfied with the imposition of
economic or social sanctions without using arbitration.

3.

The Damage Incurred by Legal Proceedings

Often parties to a contract do not want to go to court because legal
proceedings, as such, are damaging. Damages incur primarily from
the public exposure entailed by a legal proceeding, because this expo
sure may harm the litigants' privacy or reputation, or it may reveal
trade secrets. The public order may respond by allowing proceedings
in certain disputes to take place "behind closed doors." This presents
a problematic solution, however, constitutionally as well as practically.
A more viable solution involves the development of legal rules that
strengthen the parties' substantive and procedural rights of privacy,
that protects their trade secrets, and that protects their reputation.
In the private realm, we may expect many referrals to arbitration,
where confidentiality is more easily maintained. Lisa Bernstein's
study of the diamond industry shows that the secrecy ensured in arbi
tration proceedings provides a strong incentive for parties to refrain
from turning to the courts.29 Of course, parties often will develop a
private order that imposes economic and social sanctions without re
sorting to involvement with a third party (either a judge or an arbitra
tor), and thereby avoid any potentially injurious exposure that could
result therefrom.
Legal proceedings may also break up relationships, whether busi
ness or social. For this reason, parties to relational contracts establish
various mechanisms that enable them to contend with setbacks with-

27. See Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15 {"The availability of a fast and
inexpensive way of obtaining and enforcing a judgement, transforms some meritorious
claims that would have had a negative expected value had they been pursued in litigation
into claims with a positive expected return.").
28. See id.
29. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 124, 134-35.
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out destroying the relationship.30 When no such mechanisms are
available, economic and social sanctions imposed under the private
order may preserve their relationships.
ill. REsPONSES OF CONTRACT LAW TO THE PRIVATE ORDER
The type of private order developed is contingent not only on the
flaws affecting the public order, but also on the attitude of the law (as
applied by courts within the public order) toward the private order.
The law applied by courts can influence the private order in several
ways. It can encourage it and even seek its support, it can fight it and
attempt to repress it, and it can recognize it and show consideration
for it without attempting to influence its existence or its scope.31 The
less serious the flaws of the public order and, consequently, the more
effective its operation, the higher the chances that the attitude of the
law operating within it will influence the private order.
This Part explores the influence of the law applied by courts on the
development of the private order. Section III.A describes how the
public order actively encourages the private order, and Section III.B
describes how it also represses the private order. In Section III.C I
make a normative suggestion regarding how the public order can
adapt itself to an existing private order by taking nonlegal sanctions
into account when meting out legal ones. This would constitute a neu
tral attitude toward the private order, the third type of stance a public
order might- or does - take.
A.

Encouraging the Private Order

Contract law supplies the parties with tools for mutual protection
without requiring them to resort to the courts. These arrangements
presuppose that, since the public order does not act immediately and
its protection is often lacking and incomplete, the parties must take
steps to enforce contractual obligations by themselves. The rules
dealing with order of performance provide a good example. These
rules guide the parties as to how to protect themselves from nonper
formance by the other party. Thus, parties to a contract can condition
their performance so that one will not be under a duty to perform its

30. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 24-25, 31 (1980); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of
Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (1985); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
31. Cf. Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947
(1997) (discussing, inter alia, the ways law or state can ignore, strengthen, or undermine so
cial norms); Posner, supra note 1, at 1725-36 (discussing several approaches to the problem
of dealing with inefficient social norms).
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obligation without receiving equivalent performance by the other.32
Even if the parties do not condition their performance, contract law
enables one party who has reasonable grounds to believe that she will
not receive performance from the other to demand adequate assur
ance of due performance, and even suspend performance until she re
ceives such assurance.33 These rules, then, rely on the assumption that
the public order cannot supply immediate and effective protection to a
contractual party - since if it could, the order of performance would
be dictated solely by the needs of the transaction rather than by the
parties' need for assurance. The public order, then, acknowledges the
limitations of its enforcement, and encourages the parties to protect
themselves without it.
Furthermore, the public order supplies the parties with self
enforcing remedies that also strengthen their ability to enforce their
mutual obligations without recourse to courts. Examples of such
remedies include offset, price deduction,34 and possessory lien.35 In
some cases, the power to rescind a contract also protects the parties
without resorting to the court, as does the power to forfeit a deposit.36
True, all these arrangements take place under the aegis of the public
order, which controls their implementation and sets their boundaries.
Hence, this is not strictly private order, although it does bear the
marks of one.
The public order further supports and encourages the private or
der by giving effect to norms and institutions that control the private
order within the framework of the public order. It thereby increases
the benefits of these norms and institutions to its consumers, and pro
motes their improvement and development. For example, the public
order allows arbitrations. The lesser its involvement in the arbitrators'
decisions, the stronger the institutions of arbitration and the greater
their usefulness. The public order also offers the contractual parties
default rules for their contracts, compatible with their trade usages,
and courts interpret their contracts relying on these usages. Courts
also take into account the parties' "course of dealing" and "course of
performance" when interpreting the contract and filling its gaps.37 As
suming that contractual parties consider it advantageous to settle their

32 See FARNSWOR1H, supra note 8, at 561-62.
33. See U.C.C. § 2-609 {1999); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 {1981);
FARNSWOR1H, supra note 8, at 613-16.
34. See U.C.C. § 2-717.
35. See U.C.C. §§ 7-209, 7-3rr7.
36. See U.C.C. § 2-718{2).
37. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), {11), 1-205, 2-208; REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
219-223 {1981).
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disputes according to these norms of behavior,38 and that they are
aware of the possibility of finding themselves within the public order,
their benefit from using private-order norms will increase. The public
order thereby contributes to the development of norms within the pri
vate order, and ultimately strengthens the private order as a whole.
The ability of the public order to influence the development of
norms within the private order can be illustrated as follows. Let us as
sume that the prevalent practice in the furniture industry is that, when
certain defects in the manufacturer's goods appear, retailers need not
pay, whereas they do when other defects appear. Assume further that
this practice remains in the initial stages of development, and some
vagueness prevails concerning its mode of implementation. If the
public order shows willingness to enforce this practice in contractual
disputes, potential transactors interested in court enforcement of this
practice will want it to be verifiable, namely, provable in court. As a
result, the trade association may attempt to document the practice and
perhaps even to regulate it precisely, thus contributing to its en
trenchment and strengthening.
The public order may further reinforce the private order indirectly
by using information-gathering mechanisms that work within the pri
vate order and that yield information useful to the functioning of the
public order.39 Although the private order thereby will support the
public one, the private order itself may strengthen as the augmented
usefulness (to both orders) of the information-gathering mechanisms
increases the incentives to create and support those mechanisms in the
first place.40
.

B.

Repressing the Private Order

The public order will repress the private order when it perceives
the latter as bad and damaging, either to its participants or to third
parties. In extreme cases, it will use criminal law or antitrust law to
38. But see Bernstein, Immanent Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1796-802 (arguing
that traders in the grain and feed industry would expect that course of performance and
course of dealing will not trump the express terms of the contract at an end-game dispute).
For a critical view of Bernstein's argument, see David Chamy, Illusions of a Spontaneous
Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1853-57 (1996).
39. See supra Section II.B.1.
40. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2450, write: "Effective courts . • . lower the
benefit of information gathering, resulting in less well-informed manufacturers." I believe
that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, a functioning public order suffering from infor
mation problems may increase the benefits of information gathering, since this information
is useful not only to the private but also to the public order. Actually, there is a trade-off
here: Effective courts lower the benefits of information gathering for the use of the private
order, but, at the same time, increase the benefits of information gathering to a public order
that has become functional yet retains inadequate methods of information-gathering.
McMillan & Woodruff's claim, then, becomes stronger as the need for information in the
public order lessens.
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repress the private order, although less radical means can also be en
visaged.
One way to repress the private order involves limiting the applica
tion of private-order norms within the public order (that is, in courts),
even when the parties wish otherwise. The courts may refuse to apply
the private-order norms by finding them illegal or against public pol
icy, or by ignoring them when interpreting the contract or filling its
gaps.41 Assuming that parties find these norms desirable, the lack of
recognition by the public order will decrease the expected benefits of
those norms and consequently the incentives to develop them; as a re
sult, the private order will be weakened. On the other hand, the op
posite is also possible, namely, that parties acting according to these
norms will redouble their efforts not to reach the public order and will
settle their disputes outside it. Hence, in that situation, the hostility of
the public order to the parties' wishes would actually strengthen the
private order.
Another approach that represses the private order, usually uncon
sciously, grants legal effect to parties' behavior according to private
order norms that the parties had not wanted effectuated. This deters
parties from behaving according to these private-order norms. For
example, traders sometimes act according to norms of cooperation
created within the framework of a private order that go beyond the
express terms of the contract, yet they nonetheless wish disputes be
tween them to be settled according to the express terms only.42 If the
court, oblivious to this desire of the parties, grants legal effect to their
cooperative behavior toward each other and permits the "course of
performance" to trump the contract's express terms, the parties may
neglect cooperation norms a priori and thereby impair the functioning
of the private order that relies on these norms.
A decision of the Israeli Supreme Court may illustrate the damage
that could be inflicted on a private order by "legalizing" behaviors that
were not intended to lead to legal consequences of any kind. In Levin
v. Levin,43 a husband and wife reached an alimony agreement stating
that the husband would pay alimony beyond the minimum sum pre
scribed by law. The couple was going through a crisis, but they still
trusted one another and strove to settle their disputes without re
course to the courts. For this purpose, they specifically stated in the
agreement that it did not create a legal relationship and should not be
presented to the court. Later, when the wife relied on this agreement

41. See, e.g., Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162
(2d Cir. 1979) (preferring the reasonable understanding of one party to the usage of trade
prevailing in the industry).
42 See Bernstein, Immanent Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1796-802 (distinguishing
relationship-preserving norms from end-game norms).
43. C.A. 3833/93, Levin v. Levin, 48(2) P.D. 862 (1994).
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in an alimony suit, the question arose as to whether the court should
enforce it. The Supreme Court of Israel answered in the affirmative,
finding the provision that denied the creation of a legal relationship
unenforceable for public policy considerations.44 Recognizing the le
gal validity of the agreement, held the court, serves the worthy pur
pose of enforcing promises.
The objection to this decision is that, in "legalizing" the agreement,
the Supreme Court of Israel weakened the moral and social institution
of nonlegal promises. Whereas the private order prevalent before the
ruling enabled spouses to make mutual promises confining sanctions
to the social realm, in light of this ruling they can no longer do so
without incurring the risk of ultimately reaching the courts. The "le
galization" of their behavior and the drawbacks of the legal proceed
ings they must expect because of this behavior are thus detrimental to
the private order and contribute to its repression. After the decision
in the Levin case, a husband considering giving or making a promise to
give more than the minimum amount of alimony may decide not to do
so, fearing that such behavior or promise would subsequently expose
him to a law suit.45
C.

Recognizing the Private Order: The Mutual
Relations Between Sanctions

Even if the public order does not adopt a value-based position vis
a-vis the private order, and does not attempt to influence it, the public
order should nevertheless adapt itself to the existence of a private or
der functioning beside it. In this Section, I try to address the following
question: Should sanctions imposed by the private order on the party
in breach be deducted from the compensation awarded by the court
for breach of contract?46 This question is complex and deserves fur
ther elaboration; what follows are merely preliminary thoughts on this
matter. The following example illustrates the problem.
John breached his contract with Tony. Tony suffered losses of 100.
The breach of contract led to the imposition of a nonlegal sanction on
John in the shape of injury to his reputation, which is valued at 40.47
Should the court award Tony damages for an amount of 100, or only
of 60?

44. See id.

45. For the view that courts should respect the parties' determination that their com
mitments would not be legally enforceable, see Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 11, at
383-84. Cf. Melvin Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV.
821 {1997) (arguing, inter alia, against legalization of the world of gift).
46. For a thorough discussion of nonlegal sanctions - monetary, reputation-based and
hybrid sanctions - see Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15.
47.

Actually, evaluation is quite problematic in these cases, but I ignore this issue here.
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The argument in favor of awarding 60 focuses on optimal deter
rence to the party in breach. Given perfect information, optimal de
terrence will be attained if John pays a price equivalent to the full loss
caused by his breach, no less but also no more. Awarding damages of
60 will lead to this result. In contrast, awarding damages of 100 will
lead to the party in breach paying a price of 140, 40 higher than the
loss caused by his breach. This results in overdeterrence.48 The objec
tion to this argument, apparently supporting damages of 100, focuses
on the undercompensation to the aggrieved party if he receives only
60. Indeed, if the purpose of awarding damages for breach of contract
is compensation, this objection is powerful. As we will see immedi
ately, however, awarding damages of 60 is more efficient than dam
ages of 100 and, therefore, the ex ante interest of both parties actually
will be to deduct the private sanction from the public one.
This conclusion rests in part on the different incentives supplied by
the public and private orders. The nonlegal sanction imposed by the
private order differs from the legal sanction in that it does not actually
compensate the aggrieved party. How does this difference affect the
incentives of the potentially aggrieved party?49
Under contract law, aggrieved parties are entitled to full compen
sation for the foreseeable losses they suffer due to breach of contract.50
Given full compensation and perfect information, the deterrence to
the party in breach is optimal. Because she receives full compensa
tion, however, the aggrieved party remains indifferent to the breach of
contract. She will not mitigate the damages before a breach occurs,
even if it might be efficient to do so (the defense of mitigation of dam-

48. However, a counterargument could be raised, that the total losses caused by the
breach are in the amount of 140, which includes losses to the aggrieved party and losses to
the party in breach. Accordingly, efficiency requires the party in breach to internalize the
total amount of 140; otherwise, he may breach inefficiently. Thus, to achieve perfect inter
nalization of losses, he should pay 100 to the aggrieved party. Cf. Robert Cooter & Ariel
Porat, Does Risk to OneselfIncrease the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Con
flict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000) (arguing that in determining the duty of care in negligence
law courts mistakenly ignore the reduction in the injurer's self risk caused by the injurer's
precautions).

This counterargument deserves further elaboration, in which I cannot engage here. The
main weakness of the counterargument is that it treats the injury to reputation suffered by
the party in breach as a social cost, while it is actually a private cost with a correlative benefit
to society at large: the breach supplies information to society about the trustworthiness of
the party in breach. For further elaboration, see Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Court
Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from Damages? (October 2000) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
For the argument that nonlegal sanctions may supplement legal sanctions and prevent
underdeterrence, see Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 11, at 407.
49. For a discussion of the differences between legal and nonlegal sanctions with regard
to the incentives they supply to parties to a contract, see id. at 400-03.
50. Subject to some limitations, such as the requirement of certainty of damages and the
"duty" to mitigate damages. Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 806-07, 829-30.
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ages applies only from the time of the breach), she will overrely on the
contract, and she will not take efficient precautions to prevent the
breach (by cooperating with the other party, supplying him with in
formation necessary to performance, and so on).
A private order based on nonlegal sanctions supplies incentives for
performance to the party in breach51 but, at the same time, supplies in
centives to the aggrieved party to take efficient precautions. It creates
incentives for the aggrieved party because, if the contract is neverthe
less breached, the aggrieved party ends up without compensation.
Knowing this beforehand, the aggrieved party will not remain indif
ferent to a breach of contract. She will consider the possibility of a
breach by the other party and will efficiently mitigate her damages
even before a breach; she will not overrely and, at times, even will
take efficient precautions necessary to prevent the breach.52 Thus, we
could expect aggrieved parties operating in a private order, unlike
those operating in a public order, to demonstrate greater care with re
gard to mitigation of damages, reliance, and precautions adopted to
prevent a breach.53
If the analysis so far is accurate, the following question may arise:
If efficiency is attained by charging the party in breach for losses suf
fered by the aggrieved party, but without granting full compensation
to the latter, why should not parties operating within the public order
(wherein nonlegal sanctions are irrelevant) agree beforehand that the
breaching party will pay the damages to a third party? The answer to
this question is that such an agreement, even if it supplies efficient in
centives to the parties after the contract is made, typically raises the
overall costs of the contract. The reason is obvious: without a trans
feral of the right to compensation to a third party, the consequences of
a breach are that the party in breach pays, and the aggrieved party is
compensated; with a transferal of the right to compensation to a third
party, the consequences of the breach are that the party in breach
pays, but the aggrieved party is not compensated. The latter arrange-

51. I do not refer here to the question of whether these sanctions are efficient. Cf.
Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 15.
52. Robert Cooter argues that when precaution is bilateral, parties would be supplied
with the most efficient incentives if both were expected to bear the entire burden of the
harm caused by the breach (or the wrongdoing). See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract,
and Property, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1985). A private order that imposed on the party in
breach sanctions equivalent to the losses caused by the breach and, at the same time, left the
aggrieved party uncompensated, is very close to the optimal legal regime considered by
Cooter.
53. This actually may provide an additional explanation as to why parties to a contract
operating within certain types of private orders are more cooperative than parties operating
within public order. Indeed, knowing that she will bear her own losses in the event of
breach, an aggrieved party will tend to cooperate with the other party and assist him in dif
ferent ways, even if she does not feel obligated to do so.
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ment doubles the costs of breach to the contractual parties since it ex
ternalizes benefits to a third party.
This fact alone, however, does not preclude the option that, in cer
tain cases - apparently rare ones - parties to a contract may decide
it is in their interest to pay the extra price in order to supply efficient
incentives to both parties in the course of performing the contract.54
Thus, we can envisage a situation in which the performing party thinks
she may require some form of cooperation from the party receiving
performance. She may find it difficult to formulate the precise terms
of the situation requiring such cooperation, or she may fear that lack
of cooperation on the part of the other party may not be verifiable
(that is, provable in court) and perhaps even not observable (to the
performing party). A solution that may therefore seem acceptable to
the performing party is to deny the other party any compensation in
case of a breach by transferring the right to compensation to a third
party.ss This solution will ensure that the other party will not be indif
ferent to the breach, and that his incentives will be efficient.s6
To return to our example: Should a court deduct the nonlegal
sanction of 40 that the private order imposed on John from the 100 re
flecting the losses suffered by Tony? The result of such deduction is to
impose a total sanction of 100 on John, which is the equivalent of
Tony's losses, but which leaves Tony undercompensated. As noted,
however, leaving the aggrieved party completely without compensa
tion encourages her to mitigate damages efficiently before the breach,

54. In the diamond industry, arbitrators may sometimes impose sanctions on the party
in breach involving not only compensation to the aggrieved party but also a donation to
charity. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 4, at 127. This system may be jus
tified in that it provides the aggrieved party more efficient incentives than full compensation.
55. For another solution, based on the apportionment of damages between the parties,
see ARIEL PORAT, HAGANAT ASHAM TOREM BE-DINE HOZIM [CONTRIBUTORY FAULT IN
THE LAW OF CONTRACT] (1997); Ariel Porat, Contributory Negligence in Contract Law:
Toward a Principled Approach, 28 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 141 (1994); Ariel Porat, The
Contributory Negligence Defence and the Ability to Rely on the Contract, 111 L. Q. REV. 228
(1995).
56. This solution obviously raises several difficulties, which cannot be discussed within
the scope of these comments. For instance: How does a solution whereby the aggrieved
party is not compensated, but the party in breach pays damages, affect compromises be
tween the parties? How does it affect renegotiation? What incentives does it provide for
the parties' opportunistic behavior? Another question concerns the incentive of the ag
grieved party to initiate the imposition of sanctions on the party in breach when the ag
grieved party derives no benefit from the imposition. On the latter issue, see Bernstein, The
Cotton Industry, supra note 15 (clarifying the motivation of the aggrieved party to impose
nonlegal sanctions on the party in breach, even if it yields no pecuniary gains to him), and
see also McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2430 (discussing the free rider problem,
which decreases incentives to aggrieved parties to impose nonlegal sanctions, and possible
ways to overcome it). In another (unpublished) paper I am co-authoring with Robert
Cooter, we develop the idea of third party transfer contract, which we call an "anti-insurance
contract." We argue that on some occasions, the parties can charge the third party (the
"anti-insurer") a premium for transferring him the right to the damages in the event of a
breach.
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to avoid overreliance, and, at times, to take efficient precautions to
prevent the breach. Leaving Tony partly uncompensated, which is the
consequence of deducting the 40 from the 100, is more efficient than
compensating him in full.57 Reducing the compensation imposed on
John below 60 would supply more efficient incentives to Tony, but
would also result in underdeterrence of John. A third solution,
whereby John would be obliged to pay the 60 to a third party rather
than to Tony, might have been optimal with regard to the parties' in
centives after the contract was made, but would have increased the
costs of the contract by increasing the costs of a breach.
The deduction of 40 does not lead to an externalization of the con
tract's benefit to a third party in a way that increases the costs of a
breach to the parties, which would typically be unacceptable to either
of them. Rather, this deduction is just another way, different from the
traditional one, to allocate the losses incurred by the breach between
the parties to the contract.
In sum, deducting the nonlegal sanction imposed by the private
order from the damages which reflect the losses of the aggrieved party
supplies both parties with more efficient incentives than non
deduction, without externalizing any benefits to third parties.

IV. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE PUBLIC ORDER
McMillan and Woodruff show that social networks function as a
substitute for the public order in the sense that, as the public order is
strengthened, social networks are weakened. This dynamic contrasts
with that of business networks, which work in concert with the public
order and supplement it. I will attempt to explain these findings by
pointing out an important difference between social and business net
works.
Social networks sometimes require no sanction whatsoever in or
der to be effective. This occurs when contractual parties are drawn
from narrow social circles, such as close friends or relatives. In such
cases, the choice of partner to a transaction relies on overlapping in
terests: the partner's interest is not only to maximize her private util
ity but rather her own and her partner's utility at the same time, as
part of her own interest. Indeed, a partner to a transaction will be
chosen from a narrow social network especially when the community
or even the party to the transaction has relatively small chances of
monitoring the partner's behavior. These networks are particularly

57. Some of the problems mentioned in note 53, supra, are also present here. The
evaluation of nonlegal sanctions is another problem. I also ignore here the effect of the de
duction of the nonlegal sanction on the development of the private order. A thorough dis
cussion of the relations between legal and nonlegal sanctions should address all these prob
lems.
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advantageous to contractual parties when the breach of the contract or
the loss it entails is not verifiable or even observable.58
As opposed to this important advantage, social networks present a
drawback. Since the circle of potential parties remains relatively
small, matching other relevant features of the partners (except for
trustworthiness) will usually be less than optimal. McMillan and
Woodruff's finding that social networks act as substitutes for the pub
lic order, unlike business networks that act in concert with it, thus pre
sents no surprise.
Given the high price entailed by contracting
through a social network, its use should be widespread, only when le
gal or nonlegal economic sanctions are not available. Business net
works do not present this problem because they increase the chances
of finding a good partner in every regard (beyond trustworthiness),
and indeed are sometimes strengthened by a functioning public order,
whereas a social network may not be.
V.

CONCLUSION

Responses in the private order differ according to the underlying
reasons for a dysfunctional public order. Hence, if legal systems are
dysfunctional due to the corruption of the judges, we may expect all
forms of the private order to emerge: relational contracts, arbitration,
business networks, trade associations, and social networks.
If, however, the public order suffers mainly from information
problems and a private order develops as a result, we may expect arbi
trations and various information-gathering mechanisms to arise. The
use that the public order makes of the information created by these
mechanisms may actually lead to their reinforcement.
If the public order does not function because of its failure to supply
the parties with the substantive law they desire, we may expect arbi
tration mechanisms to develop, applying a substantive law acceptable
by the parties. If the public order is dysfunctional because of the costs
of litigation, we may expect the emergence of mechanisms chiefly de
signed to supply information about the transactors' reputation in the
market. If the public order is dysfunctional because of the parties'
reluctance to bear the damage of legal proceedings in courts, we may
expect increased recourse to arbitration as well as reliance on nonlegal
sanctions.
The character of the private order and its components depends on
the flaws prevailing in the public order, which prompted the private

58. Cf. Bernstein, Immanent Business Nonns, supra note 5, at 1791-92 (arguing that
when breach is observable but not verifiable, parties will prefer the extra-legal realm to the
legal one). My argument is that social networks are effective even when breach is not ob
servable either by third parties or by the aggrieved party.
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order in the first place. A comprehensive theory of the private order
must examine these flaws and their relationship with the public order.
The contents of the law operative in the public order may influ
ence the development of the private order. The public order may en
courage the private order, and probably will particularly given its
awareness of its own limitations and flaws in contrast to the advan
tages of the private order, and given its sincere desire to improve the
situation. The private order will be repressed when the public order
perceives it as more damaging than beneficial. The attitude of the
public order toward the private order may depend on the flaws of the
public order prompting the emergence of the private order in the first
place. Thus, if the private order emerged in response to problems of
information, we may assume that the public order will encourage the
private one and, at times, even seek its assistance. If problems of sub
stantive law caused the development of the private order, the public
order may attempt to reform itself in order to meet the parties' needs,
leading sometimes to the repression of the private order, and some
times to its strengthening.59 If the private order developed due to the
costs of legal proceedings, the public order may encourage the private
one, among other reasons in an attempt to lighten its own burden and
to make time and room for disputes that would justify the costs of le
gal proceedings. If the private order developed due to the parties' fear
of incurring damages due to legal proceedings, the public order may
also encourage the private one because of its ability to settle real
problems that cannot be resolved in the public order. The public or
der, however, may also try to reform itself, thereby indirectly leading
to the repression of the private order.
The most extreme cases, wherein the public order will not encour
age the private order and may even attempt to fight it (except for
cases when it is socially harmful), occur when the private order was es
tablished due to the corruption of the public order. In these cases,
judges may approach the private order as a bad idea, even when it
proves useful and beneficial to society. As the public order becomes
less effective, however, so does its ability to influence the existence of
a private order driven by social or economic forces beyond the reach
of the courts.
The public order may take into account the existence of the private
order even without adopting a normative stand toward it. The public
order's recognition of the sanctions imposed by the private order on
the parties in breach will enhance efficiency.
,

59. It could result in repression of the private order because, the better the public order,
the less the need for a private one. It could sometimes lead to a strengthening of the private
order, because acknowledging the norms of the private order within the public one may
make the development of these norms more profitable. See supra Section ill.A.
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The private order that will emerge beside the public order may in
clude social networks, in addition to the economic ones. Yet, the bet
ter the functioning of the public order, the lower the chances of exten
sive recourse to social networks.
The article by McMillan and Woodruff makes an important con
tribution to the understanding of the functions fulfilled by the private
order when the public order has failed, and to an understanding of cer
tain interactions between the two orders. I have attempted to pose
some additional questions, as well as offering several answers, con
cerning the complex relationships between the public and private or
ders.

